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Abstract – This paper assesses the authority of precedent from a phenomenological 
standpoint. Phenomenology distinguishes between two temporal models. One describes 
time in an idealised form, as a divisible chain of instants or events. The other looks at 
lived temporality as fluid and indivisible duration. In the system of precedent, we 
witness an interaction of both models. The legal order is constructed from slices in time 
that become the building blocks of future judgments. Precedents are binding for a 
potentially indefinite period and carry transcendental weight. But they are also entirely 
dependent on the occurrence of disputes in the lived world. If the law’s structural 
stability is to serve as a source of its authority, it is undermined by this paradox because 
its structure lacks the consistent input it demands. But this paper considers an 
alternative source of authority: the common law’s awareness of its structural 
shortcomings, and the mechanisms it has developed to overcome them.   
 
 
What, then, is time? If no one ask of me, I know; if I 
wish to explain to him who asks, I know not. Yet I say 
with confidence, that I know that if nothing passed 
away, there would not be past time; and if nothing were 
coming, there would not be future time; and if nothing 
were, there would not be present time.1 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This paper investigates one of the philosophical currents underlying the 
operation of the common law. This current relates to the passage of time, 
and time’s relationship with the decision-making process. In particular, I 
want to look at the concept of the legal precedent, to try to understand its 
temporal structure and to test its adherence to perceived notions of 
                                                
* Pawel Wargan holds an LLB in Law and Philosophy from the University of Essex and a 
BCL from the University of Oxford. Special thanks go to Dr Patrice Maniglier and Dr 
Tom Cornford for the invaluable feedback, support and constructive scepticism that they 
provided while I was writing the early drafts of this paper. 
1 St. Augustine, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series I, Vol I, Confessions, Trans. 
Schaff, P., Book XI (Hendrickson 1994), ch. 14. 
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temporality. As such, this is an exercise in applied phenomenology. But 
more than that, it is an attempt to develop a new angle for the discussion of 
legal authority. My hunch is that in the common law, legal authority is 
explained not in terms of the law’s responsiveness to social convention, but 
in the stability and continuity of a particular temporal standpoint. In my 
assessment of this hypothesis, I will define this temporal standpoint by 
reference to two measures of time that are most clearly manifested in the 
common law order: the instant and perpetuity. At both the systemic level—
that is, in the very system of precedent—and the internal level of individual 
cases, there is a complex interplay of these two elements, which creates the 
legal scaffolding that is then furnished with the substantive content of the 
law. As this study is interested in the systemic temporal structure of the 
common law, I will not confine myself to one area of law, but instead draw 
from a variety of areas where these issues are most clearly observed.  
 First, a confession: the seed for this paper comes from a question 
posed by Jacques Derrida: “what if the law, without being itself transfixed 
by literature, shared the conditions of its possibility with the literary 
object?” 2  One implication of this question (and this observation is 
especially pronounced in relation to the common law) is that the law could 
be described as having an essentially narrative structure and that its 
temporality is established by strict linear causality—that is, by adherence to 
precedent. Derrida continues: 
“Though the authority of the law seems to exclude all historicity 
and empirical narrativity, and this at the moment when its 
rationality seems alien to all fiction or imagination—even the 
transcendental imagination—it still seems a priori to shelter these 
parasites.”3 
Derrida is, of course, writing about the civil law system, where legal 
precedent plays a less central role than it does in common law. Without 
delving into literary theory, I am interested in the idea that the common law 
system involves the accumulation of rules developed and applied in a 
particular temporal order. Like the chapters of a novel that constitute its 
plot and lead to a convincing and coherent conclusion, legal judgments 
construct a picture of a certain judicial order and, ultimately, reinforce the 
authority of lawmakers. On this view, common law authority, or the power 
                                                
2 Jacques Derrida, ‘Before the Law’, in Derek Attridge (ed), Acts of Literature. 
(Routledge 1992), 191. 
3 ibid, 190. 
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to bind others—the grand conclusion of the legal narrative—is dependent 
on an internal coherence of the system and its rules.  
 In the old English Court of Chancery, a claim seeking the 
enforcement of an equitable right was required to prove “an ancestry 
founded in history and in the practice and precedents of the court 
administering equity jurisdiction.”4 This is an appropriate description for 
the analytical process that governs common law trials insofar as it calls for 
the discovery of existing rules applicable to a given scenario. But it is also 
a bold statement, loaded with significance in the context of this discussion. 
The language of ancestry, of history and of narrativity suggests the 
existence of particular events occurring in linear succession that can be 
amassed into a larger whole. Each precedent is a building block of future 
decisions. Narrative form is also discernible in some legal instruments. The 
contract, generally speaking, lays out a series of conditions that become 
binding at the moment the document is signed. The will disposes of 
property at a future date subject to certain conditions. The date of birth is a 
legal reference point for the allocation of rights “to participate in the 
democratic life of the [European] Union”5 and the imposition of related 
responsibilities. In English law, property ownership is a purely temporal 
concept.6   
 These sketches point to a legal fixation with a constructive model of 
time. That is, one capable of being constructed from basic units: instants. 
They determine legal timetables, trial dates, the number of hours a lawyer 
can bill for and lengths of prison sentences.7  We are culpable at the 
moment the criteria of legal culpability intersect. We become ‘valid’ 
                                                
4 Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465, 481. 
5 Treaty on the European Union, Title II, Article 10. 
6 See Latham CJ in Minister of State for the Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261, 277: 
“no subject can hold land allodially—he can only own an estate in land.” ‘Allodial’ is 
defined in opposition to ‘feud’ (see ‘Feud’, definition 2) in Merriam-Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary (Eleventh Ed., Merriam-Webster Inc. 2004). Accordingly, it 
refers to land that is held absolutely, as opposed to ‘in feud’, i.e. under the feudal 
system. The feudal ownership of land involved renting land (a temporal act) from the 
allodial owner of land in a spatial sense—the Crown. The Crown remains the absolute 
owner of land to this day, and the ‘estate in land’ refers to the slice in time in which 
one’s rights over a particular property exist. 
7 French generally describes the importance of time—and of new scientific means of 
temporal measurement—on the legal system. She develops a taxonomy of different 
theories of time, including those in philosophy, science and psychology, then shows 
how these apply in legal scenarios generally. This wide approach serves to open the 
discussion for the more precise application of its ideas. Rebecca R French, ‘Time in 
the Law’ (2001) 72 University of Colorado Law Review 664-665, 745. 
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citizens at the date of our birth. Something happens in the instant in time: 
legal weight is suddenly ingrained into the fabric of lived experience.  
 But legal temporality is more richly textured than this. It goes 
beyond the language of historicity and precedent. There are strict liability 
crimes—standards of culpability that bypass the constructive element of 
the crime—and retrospective and prospective laws. While beyond the 
scope of the present discussion, these issues point to the importance of 
temporal processes in legal decision-making. Indeed, little study has been 
conducted on the law’s temporal structure, but it is an area with serious 
theoretical ramifications, as one role of judges and legislators is to alter 
lived temporality by enacting static rules that are unconstrained by time’s 
fickleness. For this reason, “[t]ime is always necessary in the law.”8  
 Here, the central tension of this discussion begins to crystallise. The 
tension is between temporality in the lived world, which is associated with 
organic and indivisible movement, and the idealised world of mathematical 
time, which compartmentalises lived experience into symbols and 
formulae. To understand how these mechanisms conflict in the process of 
legal decision-making requires a critical analysis of these ways of thinking 
about time.  
 One of my broad aims in approaching this paper has been to look at 
how legal decision-making takes place from a position of temporal 
authority. In the common law, a court has the power to apply precedent 
(both hierarchical9 and temporal) in order to reach a conclusion. The case 
may then be referred to a higher authority, but the final decision establishes 
a legal benchmark for future conduct. The instant at which the decision is 
made represents the moment at which legal value is imparted into lived 
experience, and that unit of legal decision-making is binding indefinitely 
until it is revised. It is not entirely clear how the law justifies this use of 
temporal precedent and how the application of static temporal units to 
                                                
8 French (n 7) 663. 
9 The hierarchy in the United Kingdom is a system of courts. At the bottom of the 
hierarchy are the subordinate courts: the County Courts and Tribunals for civil cases, 
and the Magistrates’ Courts for criminal cases. Higher up, three divisions of the High 
Court operate both as civil courts of first instance and as appellate courts for criminal 
and civil cases, while the Crown Court deals with criminal cases, both at first instance 
and on appeal. Then there is the Court of Appeal, which has a criminal and civil 
division. Finally, there is the Supreme Court. The decisions of each court within the 
hierarchy establish precedents that are indefinitely binding on all lower courts, and only 
the Supreme Court has the discretion to overrule its previous decisions. Despite this, a 
departure from precedent by the Supreme Court will be circumscribed by legislation; 
Parliament is the final arbiter in English law. 
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events in the dynamic lived world affects the law’s authority. In exploring 
this question, it is important to begin by looking at the ontology of time 
itself: what kind of thing is time, what is its structure, what is the process of 
reasoning by which we come to understand it?  
 
B. THEORIES OF TIME 
We can distinguish between two understandings of time. One is the realist 
position, also known as Newtonian time. On this model, time is 
independent of any external factors; it is a sequential ordering of events. 
This structure allows for the divisibility of time into measurable units and 
time is the packaging that accumulates those units.10 The other view, which 
has become a cornerstone of phenomenological accounts of time, is that 
time consists of indivisible duration. It is thematic in that it presents us with 
a reality that cannot be deconstructed. It is more whole.  
 Bergson identifies each view with a different category of 
knowledge.11 Realist time gives us relative knowledge, which can only be 
obtained through the observation of an object from without. It is knowledge 
that is contingent on the observer’s point of vantage, and so it yields an 
imperfect and incomplete view of the object. Duration, by contrast, is 
associated with absolute knowledge because it is internal to the object 
being observed. To have absolute knowledge of an object is to be “in 
sympathy” with its states of flux—to know it perfectly.12 
 We obtain relative knowledge through the process of analysis. The 
observed object is reduced to “elements already known… elements 
common both to it and other objects”.13 Thus, we ascribe meaning to 
objects by comparison with known benchmarks; we are able to define 
slices in time as seconds, weeks or years. Yet we do not feel instants, and 
we are incapable of precisely identifying a temporal unit in which 
something occurred.  The precise identification of the instant would require 
us to refine our measurement techniques ad infinitum. This process 
suggests that the instant cannot be precisely located within a temporal 
continuum; it is an ideal.14  
                                                
10 Ned Markosian, ‘Time’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (2008), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/time/#3.  
11 Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (1912) T.E. Hulme trans. (Hackett 
Publishing 1999). 
12 ibid 23. 
13 ibid 24. 
14 Michael Dummett, ‘Is Time a Continuum of Instants?’ Philosophy (CUP 2000) 497-
515. 
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 Instead, we use language to assign a unitary quality to our otherwise 
indivisible experiences. We define time on a macro and micro scale.15 On 
one hand, the unit of the second, minute or hour helps us put duration into a 
kind of theoretical perspective: we define our place in a given setting 
within a particular temporal context (e.g. the trip took 30 minutes; I signed 
the document at 15:30). When we ask for the time, we are given a specific 
number of hours and minutes; a Google search for ‘time’ yields the current 
time in its geo-spatial context. These temporal units are firmly embedded in 
our everyday language. On the other hand, we use the notion of the week, 
month or year to contain groups of experiences. These macro 
measurements of time already represent a breakdown of the concept of the 
temporal unit: many things occur over the course of a week or month, and 
they begin to resemble the temporal theme more than they resemble any 
identifiable unit. When we look at patterns of time on the macro scale, we 
begin to see time as a cultural force: it is cyclical, symbiotically attached to 
daylight cycles, the changing seasons, the arability of land. 
 Absolute knowledge is obtained through intuition. Bergson 
understands intuition as an ‘intellectual sympathy’ with an object—a state 
of understanding the object from within.16 Objects in the lived world exist 
in a state of Heraclitean flux—they experience no two identical states. If 
we cannot know an object in its innate state, our understanding of it is 
limited by analysis: we compare the states we witness to states that we 
already know, thus replicating elements that are in fact unique. In our 
experience of temporality, intuition allows us to dispense with the 
metaphors and symbols of Newtonian time, because our knowledge of the 
object is already perfect.  
 Our understanding of time is thus governed by its constitutive 
duality: it comprises a mathematical model of constructed time, and 
experienced duration, which is extended and indivisible. Husserl developed 
the idea that the starting point of perception is the ‘natural standpoint’. This 
is a taking for granted of the totality of the world and its phenomena that is 
untarnished by the language of philosophy. We perceive objects and 
phenomena, and they exist without the need for ‘conceptual thinking’.17 
We naturally ascribe certain values to external objects in the world. In that 
sense, lived experience is cultural, rather than scientific or otherwise 
                                                
15 Liaquat Ali Khan, ‘Temporality of Law’ (2009) 40 McGeorge Law Review 59-61. 
16 Bergson (n 11) 23. 
17 Edmund Husserl, Ideas (1913), W.R. Boyce Gibson trans. (Humanities Press 1976) 
101. 
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systematic. The objects we perceive are beautiful or ugly, inviting or 
frightening; people we communicate with are friends or foes, superiors or 
colleagues. Our responses to these elements create a “world of values, a 
world of goods, a practical world.”18 The natural standpoint, then, relates to 
a pure ‘lived-world’ existing before the language of philosophy, science 
and mathematics, which strive to explain experience.  
 Our natural standpoint to time consists of our inherent acceptance of 
its passage and influence on the world, without the attempt of measurement 
or justification. On the other hand, Bergson argues that “abstract time”, 
understood theoretically as a series of instants, is an artificial construct that 
appears in mathematics and suits human language. It is distinct from 
“concrete duration”, which is the succession of events without distinction, 
or experienced time passage. Going further, Bergsonian duration is 
constructed as a kind of temporal ouroboros: each indefinite instant,19 
having moved to the past, feeds the present and culminates in an ever-
progressing temporal sum.20  
 The analysis of our intuition of duration is expressed in language. 
We ascribe ideal qualities to experience, to measure and explain what we 
see and feel. Thus, we enter the post-scientific world where objects have 
theoretical definition, and are explicable in ideal terms. The discord 
between the basic nature of raw experience and the fullness of the 
understood world has been a recurring theme in Western philosophy. It 
applies equally to our understanding of time. Time in its experienced form 
simply passes, but we grant it structure by describing it in unitary terms. 
And when we grant it meaning, time’s structure comes alive; it becomes “a 
delineator of rights that are initiated and terminated at certain times… [an] 
organiser for telling us when we are supposed to go to lunch...”21 
 On Bergson’s view, an empirical model of time would require “a 
multiplicity of parts or units, which are absolutely alike.”22 This, he says, is 
the product of a confusion of duration in a spatial sense and in a temporal 
sense. Space, Bergson argues, is a homogenous and quantitative 
multiplicity. When time is understood as a series of parts occurring in 
spatial succession—of discernible lines on a ruler—it is reduced to a 
                                                
18 ibid 103. 
19 I use ‘instant’ here for want of a more precise term. The instant is, in fact, 
identifiable, whereas Bergsonian duration is based on the idea that we cannot 
distinguish between events; each successive moment is part of a larger flowing whole. 
20 Henri Bergson, Time & Free Will (Elibron Classics 2005) 79. 
21 French (n 7) 665. 
22 Bergson (n 20) 76. 
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measurable causal model: each instant causes the subsequent one, and is 
dependent on the one that came before; we “count the points of duration by 
means of points in space.”23 But time’s passage cannot be understood in 
terms of homogenous instants, occurring in ideal linear succession, with 
each instant being distinguishable. Instead, Bergson likens it to the 
unwinding of a spool. Duration follows a constant and indivisible thread. 
To cut it would be to create two events from one. Yet this metaphor, 
Bergson concedes, is imperfect: the unwinding of the spool can still be 
understood in linear terms, since the spool has a continuous and predictable 
form. In duration, no two states are comparable.24 So Bergson suggests:  
“Let us take our mind off the space subtending the movement and 
concentrate solely on the movement itself, on the act of tension or 
extension, in short, on pure mobility. This time we shall have a 
more exact image of our development in duration.”25   
 At first, this view appears to constitute a push away from empiricism 
and the analytical methods of science, and indeed the law. Yet it would be 
wrong to come to such a conclusion. Bergson discusses the processes of 
analysis and intuition as complementary. It is possible, he says, to pass 
from intuition to analysis, or to ascribe to an experienced thing an idealised 
quality. But the contrary is impossible: one cannot start at analysis and 
derive intuition from it. Analysis merely serves as a convenient reminder of 
what has already been.26 The process of analysis yields nothing more than 
static elements, without replicating the state of constant flux in itself. Yet 
intuition allows us to revise the products of analysis as we experience new 
things. This yields nothing more than “a clumsy imitation, a counterfeit of 
real movement, but this imitation is much more useful in life than the 
intuition of the thing itself would be.”27 
 That measured time is a conceptual ideal which does not firmly 
correspond to fundamental temporal intuitions has implications for any 
institution founded on a modular temporal model. When trying to decode 
the temporal dynamics at work in the common law system, I think that we 
need to begin by distinguishing between what we might call ‘modular 
time’, representing the ordered sequence of events, and time as a 
                                                
23 ibid 78. 
24 Bergson (n 11) 26. 
25 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Mabelle L. 
Andison (Citadel Press 1992) 165. 
26 Bergson (n 11) 41-42. 
27 ibid 44. 
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phenomenological theme, or a particular perception of the fluid and 
constant relationship between events. The modular model comprises 
instants in time stringed together to form a narrative. The temporal theme is 
a duration of indistinct events. A careful interaction between the two exists 
in the common law. The instant serves as the point of law’s creation, after 
which it passes into the grand theme of the law: a decision becomes 
perpetually binding until a subsequent case revises it.  
 The law, like science, has dominion over Bergsonian analysis. Yet it 
would be wrong to dismiss its authority on the grounds that the products of 
its analysis are detached from the ‘authentic’ state of duration. The 
question to ask, as Bergson notes, is whether analysis follows from 
intuition in legal reasoning, or whether the law seeks to define intuition 
itself.   
 
C. THE LEGAL STANDPOINT 
Every legal decision fits within a broader structure that seeks to provide 
continuity within the legal order, to deliver justice when disputes arise and, 
particularly within democratic political regimes, to balance the powers of 
the executive and legislative branches of government. This structure 
demands substantive content to furnish it with meaning. This is drawn from 
the particular facts of individual cases, which serve as benchmarks by 
which to judge and apply law; the similarity of a precedent to a 
contemporary legal scenario will serve as a trigger for that precedent’s 
application. Then, new law will be developed. In simple terms, the law can 
be described as having an external structure with a corresponding set of 
internal facts, and the combination of the two yields the substantive content 
of the law.  
 I want to be clear in distinguishing these two levels of legal decision-
making. The first is the systemic structure of the system of precedent—the 
scaffolding of temporal and hierarchical precedent through which factual 
circumstances of particular cases are processed to deliver judgments. A 
judgment occurs at a time and is indefinitely binding until it is overturned. 
A series of judgments constitutes the building blocks of the system of 
precedent. This temporal structure is distinguished from Bergsonian time in 
an important way. Bergsonian time incorporates past events into the 
present. On this model, the effect of the past is cumulative—the present is 
already incorporated into the past as it occurs. Time progresses in a fluid 
manner, always feeding itself. This constitutes duration. The system of 
legal precedent also depends on the past for continuity—an established 
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judgment becomes a tool for applying rules in the present if its facts 
correspond to those of a present legal situation. But this past is stagnant and 
contained to an instant; it is a slice of time that is clearly marked and 
separated from the temporal continuity of the lived world. The system of 
legal citation, which always includes a date, freezes a judgment in a 
particular temporal context. Old judgments are locked away in books 
where they gather dust. In the world of the legal precedent, there is no 
continuity of duration.  
 The other element of the system of precedent is the internal level of 
the individual case. This stands in contrast to the timelessness of precedent 
generally, since it exists in a contemporary setting, at the time the dispute 
occurs. There is an interesting interaction between these two levels. One 
exists indefinitely and creates structural coherence within the common law 
system. The other occurs spontaneously and is sucked into this structural 
framework when a triggering event brings a dispute to light and the 
governing legal order demands its resolution.  
 We have a clear recognition that the ontology of the common law is 
one of ‘ancestry’. This chain of historical precedent is the hallmark of the 
system; the passing of law from one precedent to the next is one of its 
structural features. Its importance is brought to light in the application of 
precedent on the internal level of the individual case. This has important 
parallels to Bergson’s concept of analysis: to apply a legal precedent is to 
compare a new element with elements drawn from the repository of prior 
experience. It is to “express a thing as a function of something other than 
itself.”28 
 The function of the system of precedent is the resolution of disputes, 
which is done with reference to decisions made by individuals at precise 
moments in time. This function has been recognised as an intrinsic 
component of the common law—of the legal standpoint.29 The law will not 
hold me accountable before I have committed a crime, and the law will not 
seek to impose penalties if I have not breached a contract. It will do so only 
where it can identify an instant in which a violation has occurred. This 
instant marks the point of law’s bindingness, and without these triggering 
instants, the law is dormant. Of course, there are certain temporally 
                                                
28 Bergson (n 11) 24. 
29 Referred to as the legal attitude in Wayne M Martin, ‘Time to Decide’ Society for 
Existential Phenomenology Conference (Christchurch, Oxford, 25-28 June, 2010) 11, 
available at <http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~wmartin/wmcvA4.pdf>, to which I 
credit this idea. 
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extended legal instruments. The contract is one example. Its bindingness is 
confined to a precise timetable, within which the obligations it establishes 
need to be fulfilled.30 But the contract is only a precautionary and guiding 
document until the point that it is breached. Then the law comes into play.  
 The corollary of this is that laws exist for a temporally indefinite 
period. A law—that is, both a statutory provision and a decision by a 
common law court—will continue to bind the court system until it is 
repealed or amended. This requires a dispute to trigger such an 
amendment—something needs to occur for judges to dust off the books of 
legal precedent and consider the rules they contain. In some cases, the dust 
has grown thick. A case from 1568, which held that any deposits of gold or 
silver automatically belong to the crown, remains valid law to this day.31 
Over time, numerous principles have been added to this royal prerogative: 
all rights in petroleum, including natural gas and mineral oil, are now also 
vested in the crown.32 As it stands, these laws build upon the early 
principles of the royal prerogative, which is indefinitely binding.  
 The law draws on temporal precedent to interpret a particular 
moment. Thus, modular time is a constitutive element of the legal structure. 
Each instant in time where law is created forms a basic unit of legal 
packaging, which then contains the facts and decisions of particular cases. 
These decisions are imbued with a special significance: unless overturned 
or revised, they are binding forever. Thus, legal precedent acquires a 
transcendental quality: it is an immutable and unchanging source of legal 
truth.  
 The law takes for granted that legal events occur in structured, linear 
progression. And it makes use of a temporally loaded vocabulary to 
describe this progression on both a macro and micro scale: ‘history’, 
‘ancestry’, ‘precedent’, and even terms like ‘scintilla temporis’: a sliver in 
time that once marked the moment where a legal interest in a mortgaged 
property was created.33 Within the law is embedded a precise language of 
                                                
30 In other words, the contract can be distinguished from a law generally by its power to 
require particular behaviours from the contracting parties, rather than simply forbid 
certain practices. 
31 Case of Mines or R v Earl of Northumberland (1568) 1 Plowd.310, 75 ER 472. 
32 Petroleum Act 1998. 
33 Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1990] UKHL 3; I mention this to highlight 
the specificity of temporal tools at the disposal of common law judges. This particular 
tool creates a ‘sliver in time’ between the creation of a proprietary interest in favour of 
the mortgagor and the granting of a mortgage in favour of a mortgagee. This serves to 
give temporal precedence to one event that, for all practical purposes, occurs 
simultaneously with another. 
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modular temporality that acts as a kind of structural scaffolding built from 
statutes and judgments. But there is a distinction between the legal position 
on time, and our inherent perception of it. Bergsonian ‘concrete duration’ 
does not discriminate between instants. It is the seamless interplay between 
heterogenous events that precludes the repetition, or even direct 
identification, of any particular instant. So the human natural standpoint is 
characterised by a passive recognition of time’s fluidity; this is built into 
our perceptual mechanisms. The legal standpoint is characterised by the 
assumption that time is modular. It is a constructed reality that requires 
triggers to progress. It is only imbued with meaning once these triggers 
force the application of existing rules to new circumstances. And the 
meaning of legal judgments on a structural level is significant.  
 On the internal level, too, we see a strong preference for modular 
time. Cases are constructed from carefully constituted factual scenarios. 
The assessment of these scenarios, in light of examples and rules drawn 
from precedent, leads to a binary outcome, and sets an example for further 
trials to follow. In the criminal law, a series of cases established that a 
crime requires the concurrence of mens rea and actus reus – that is, it seeks 
to identify the temporal instant where, broadly, the guilty mind meets the 
unlawful act (criminal lawyers will forgive the imprecision of this 
language). In one case,34 four men took a victim to a hut and got him 
drunk. They had earlier planned to kill him, and when they struck him in 
the head with a blunt object, the mens rea to kill was present. The four men 
rolled the body up a hill and disposed of it by pushing it off the edge of a 
cliff, hoping to make it seem like the fall caused the death. 
 But the victim hadn’t died. The blow caused merely him to lose 
consciousness and he died of exposure at some point after the fall from the 
cliff. The argument before the court was that at the time of death, there was 
no mens rea to kill. The four men only intended to dispose of a body, and 
the only identifiable intersection of mens rea and actus reus concerned 
their assault on him, which did not cause his death. But the court rejected 
this argument, saying that it is “impossible to divide up what was really one 
transaction.” To call a series of distinct events a part of one “transaction” is 
to try to conform real-world events to a particular understanding of 
temporality and causality. It is to acknowledge that the law is strict in 
requiring events to exist within a particular temporal packaging: the instant. 
This is what Bergson referred to when he described the confusion between 
                                                
34 Thabo Meli v R (1954) 1 AER 373 (PC). 
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events in space and time. Trying to imagine a line on a ruler or a particular 
number, we need to lay out the constitutive parts of that unit on a spatial 
plane, and visualise where we want to end up. Thus, when we are thinking 
of the number three, we think of it as being constituted from three digits, or 
imagine the numbers one and two preceding it in a causal sequence.35 This 
quantum leap from chronology to legal causality is one that is demanded by 
the common law. And it requires events to be structured such that this 
causal relationship is clearly defined. But when the structure of real-world 
events is not parcelled out in this way, difficulties arise.  
 This is an example of a dilemma that I think is central to legal 
decision-making, and to phenomenology. It involves the reconciliation of a 
modular understanding of temporality with the reality of experienced 
events. Courts are often forced to adapt precedent in a way that suits the 
particular circumstances of a case, but these circumstances may not always 
be divided into distinct temporal units. The law’s response in Thabo Meli 
was to look for larger temporal packaging to accommodate what was in 
fact a series of separate acts. 
 Even in subsequent criminal law decisions, the preference for the 
temporal instant remained central. In one case, a man committed a number 
of brutal acts against his girlfriend, who eventually died. It was impossible 
to ascertain which act killed her. The judge directed the jury to decide 
whether any of the acts on their own could have caused her death.36 Again, 
the question was not whether the perpetrator caused the death, but whether 
a single action attributable to him at a particular time could have been its 
cause. Here, the act of killing is untethered from the perpetrator, and 
attached to a wider causal framework in which the perpetrator’s guilty 
mind already plays a role. To put it differently, if at points t1, t2 and t3 we 
can show that the perpetrator had a guilty mind – a continuous intention to 
kill that transcended the particular instants in which his actions were said to 
occur – we only need to show that at one of those points his action was the 
realisation of that intention.  
 On an internal level, the legal standpoint is characterised by its 
binary outcome. Someone is either culpable or not, and the decision rests 
on whether someone’s action can be traced to a particular instant and 
placed within established causal structures. This can swing the pendulum 
of culpability one way or the other. So, just as we can construct a vertical 
                                                
35 Bergson (n 20) 78-79. 
36 Attorney-General's Reference (No 4 of 1980) [1981] 1 WLR 705. 
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hierarchy of the court system, we can construct a temporal hierarchy of 
legal decision-making in general. The court looks at whether the right 
events satisfy the right conditions in the right order. The events form the 
factual background of a case, the conditions involve matters of precedent, 
and the right order refers to a kind of temporal framework in which all this 
has to occur (this has a particular relation to the application of precedent, 
which we will look at later). Each of these elements is a collection of 
instants. They are packaged together and present us with one of two 
outcomes: the case succeeds or fails.  
 A judgment thus occurs within the very narrow temporal framework 
of the instant: it is a culmination of a number of factors that result in a rule, 
which will remain perpetually valid until it is invoked in a subsequent case, 
where the court has the power to overrule it. But the binary possibilities 
each decision presents mean that these instants are without duration. 
Nothing happens over the course of a case; the case is decided, and we are 
left with a digital building block of future judgments. Here we have the 
hallmarks of the classical understanding of time as a measurable 
phenomenon composed of instants without duration.  
 I have already suggested that defining a precise unit of time is 
practically impossible. Rupert Read suggests that defining temporal change 
according to static units is, in a sense, logically unintelligible.37 The law 
can adopt any temporal model, but the question of its authority only gains 
importance when we see that model departing from conventional 
understandings of time in a way that creates a rift between the law and 
society. As Bergson notes, it is a mistake to derive intuition from analysis. 
Yet even if we presuppose that intuition does determine analysis in legal 
reasoning – after all, rules flow from originating disputes in the real world 
– this process is undermined by what I have identified as the legal 
standpoint, one element of which is the requirement of events in the real 
world to trigger the analytical process. Instants in modular time occur with 
strict regularity and are amassed into a continually progressing whole – in 
human life, the process of analysis is never dormant. Events are analysed as 
they occur and the ‘counterfeit of real movement’ is continually reassessed, 
yielding a pale but useful imitation of duration. Legal time, by contrast, 
waits until a dispute occurs or a crime is committed. In that sense, the ideal 
of legal time is entirely dependent on imperfections in the lived world. In 
                                                
37 Rupert Read, ‘Is 'What is time?' a good question to ask?’ (2002) 77 Philosophy 2 193-
209.  
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the system of precedent, then, the tension between the perpetuity of 
duration and the transience of the legal judgment is felt particularly 
strongly.  
 
D. A TENSION BETWEEN PERPETUITY AND TRANSIENCE 
In a 1789 letter to James Madison, Thomas Jefferson said that the 
“question whether one generation of men has a right to bind another, seems 
never to have been started either on this or our side of the water.” He 
asserted in the letter that “no society can make a perpetual constitution, or 
even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation.”38 
Jefferson was troubled by the idea of a static law, one that binds across 
generations without responding to the fluidity of culture. This worry is 
about the law’s dual nature: as a rule enacted at a time, and as one that 
binds for a potentially infinite duration.  
 Considering the hierarchical structure of the institutions of English 
law, rules that are outdated could remain binding until they reach the 
Supreme Court or are revised by Parliament. Individuals may find 
themselves culpable under relics of obsolete cultural standards or political 
agendas.  
 The arguments supporting perpetuity within the doctrine of 
precedent, and the attached disregard for the dynamics of cultural and 
political norms, cite the need for “systemic stability” within the legal 
system:  
“The doctrine has been praised as a principle of justice and stability, 
which safeguards settled expectations. In one sense, the temporality 
of precedent is past-oriented since the past (t1) holding controls the 
present (t2) holding. Seen differently, precedent enforces timeless (∞) 
law that transcends the qualitative social difference between the past 
(t1) and the present (t2).”39 
But can perpetuity serve as a benchmark of legal stability? Earlier, I wrote 
about the tools we have developed to measure time. Specifically, I 
discussed the cyclical nature of macro time, which is rooted in an 
understanding of natural patterns and the transience of life. The date of 
birth confers upon a citizen certain rights and responsibilities within his 
political community. Similarly, the date of death terminates those 
responsibilities. Each individual, and each human endeavour, can be said to 
                                                
38Thomas Jefferson, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Julian P. Boyd et al (eds) 
(Princeton University Press,1950). 
39 Khan (n 15) 84. 
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have a termination date beyond which any talk of legal responsibility 
becomes incoherent. This is reflected in a new transcendental philosophy, 
which adopts human intuition as its guide. Thus, truth becomes subjective 
and is untethered from any immutable and eternal sources. 
 This natural order is reflected in the attitude of common law courts 
and legislative bodies, which are reluctant to accept any legal arrangement 
of infinite duration. A contract cannot be established for an indefinite 
period, but must have a specific termination date.40 In the law of trusts, 
there is a rule against perpetuities.41 Culpability for non-serious crimes 
expires after a time dependent on the severity of the sentence,42 and even 
sentences for serious crimes have a limited temporal scope. Even symbolic 
sentences that exceed a criminal’s expected lifetime are calculated with the 
lifetime as a guiding benchmark; the sentences may be given in multiples 
of the lifetime. In human endeavours, as in proclamations of the law, 
temporality is directly attached to natural patterns of life and death.  
 If we return to our initial question – what if the law shares the 
narrative structure with literature? – we see clearly some of the tensions 
that arise. On a structural level, the law is tethered to an order that relies on 
the perpetuity of rules: this is a hallmark of its stability. But, viewed as 
sources of truth, these rules take on a transcendental character. Until 
overturned, the validity of a precedent established by the Supreme Court is 
absolute. But it is also detached from the needs and intuitions of 
contemporary society. As such, it is an external source of truth that is 
applied to resolve human disputes, which have an individual and 
contemporary character.  
 At the same time, the internal structure of the law requires the 
recognition of shifting cultural norms, but this recognition is always 
circumscribed by precedent. In other words, the discretion afforded to a 
judge by a previous ruling limits his ability to import new principles into 
his decision. So, the temporal packaging that contains the legal, cultural 
and political standards of a particular time is stored away until a triggering 
                                                
40 See, eg, cases on the requirement of certainty in property leases: Prudential 
Assurance Co Ltd v London Residuary Body [1992] 2 AC 386; Lace v Chantler 
[1944] KB 368. 
41 See, generally, Law Commission, ‘The Rules Against Perpetuities and Excessive 
Accumulations’ Item 7 of the Sixth Programme of Law Reform: The Law of 
Trusts(1998), available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/lc251_The_Rules_Against_Perpetuiti
es_and_Accumulations.pdf. 
42 Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. 
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dispute brings it to light. Then, supposing that the original judgment was 
made by the right court, it emerges with all the authority it held at the point 
of its creation.43  
 If we look deeper into the factual circumstances of a case, we see a 
similar trend. Judges apply the language of modular temporality to describe 
events in sequence and to construct a viable narrative for the particular 
purposes at hand. This sequence matters. Sometimes, it is applied on a truly 
micro scale: did the defendant have his fingers inside or outside the 
windowsill at the time the victim gave him permission to enter her room?44 
Here, the decision hinged on a matter of seconds. But it is not the duration 
of the activity that the courts look for. It is the placement of this particular 
occurrence within a compartmentalised temporal framework, which 
satisfies the structural requirements established in previous cases. 
 This is linked in an important way to our use of language. The 
defendant in a criminal trial will be asked to recount the order in which 
something happened. His answers will be drawn from memory, in which 
events are structured in a particular way (indeed, being of ‘sound memory’ 
has been named as an essential component of culpability for murder).45 
Depending on the context, a person may have arranged these events, 
compartmentalised them and prepared to recount them in deposition. But it 
is also possible that the events have become distorted, that their sequence 
has not been reduced to instants in memory, that they exist as a single 
temporal theme of indivisible duration. That is, they exist in the 
phenomenological model of perceived time, rather than within a wider 
universal temporality that can be dissected to fit the causal structures 
demanded by a particular case. But during a trial, the facts of the case will 
be repeated in varying contexts. The story might be told in chronological 
order and retold with reverse chronology. Just as the legal judgment is 
binding at a time, we get a sense of the courtroom as a static space, existing 
outside the dynamics of lived temporality.46  
 Earlier, I wrote that the implications of the law’s temporal model are 
only relevant insofar as they interfere with the intuition of lived experience. 
On an internal level, at least, legal analysis appears to satisfy Bergson’s 
account of the complementarity of analysis and intuition. The common law 
is imposing a particular understanding of temporality on our consciousness. 
                                                
43 That is, subject to the rules on legal interpretation. 
44 R v Collins [1973] QB 100. 
45 3 Co Inst 47. 
46 French (n 7) 701. 
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That is to say, it demands of us that we compartmentalise that which lacks 
a naturally causal and narrative order. It imposes on the imprecise 
temporality of the lived world a mathematical structure that serves both to 
clarify a situation for the purposes of establishing legal causation and to 
distort the actual fluid nature of events. Time in the common law is 
different from perceived time. It is a structured temporality that bends, 
twists and orders time to suit its particular demands.47 Yet over the course 
of a judgment, legal time only serves to clarify and package intuition into 
analysis. This occurs within a relatively short timeframe and the distortion 
between intuition and analysis need not be more severe than is 
conceptually desirable. In other words, the counterfeit of courtroom time is 
tolerable. 
 But the system of precedent as a whole reveals, at least on a raw 
structural level,48 a reliance on transcendental absolutes in time—on eternal 
principles detached from the subjective intuitions of the individuals to 
whom the law applies. Viewed like this, the state of the legal precedent is 
radicalised. It becomes a deference to the transcendental authority of the 
past, which undermines the uniqueness of the present. The process of 
contrasting a (potentially distant) point in time with the facts of a present 
case serves to filter out the particular temporal setting that defines the 
contemporary dispute. Legal meaning, then, is not derived from the 
subjective cultural norms of the individuals to whom the law applies, but 
from absolutes existing in some distinct slice in time. The precedent is 
deified at the potential expense of relevance.49  
 
E. REINING IN THE INSTANT 
The structure of legal language is the structure of causation, which has two 
functions. One is “forward-looking: that of specifying what will happen 
and by what stages if certain conditions are present together. This use of 
cause serves to provide recipes and make predictions. It also yields the idea 
                                                
47 ibid. 
48 By “raw structural level”, I am referring to the system of precedent as understood 
independently of the whole common law judicial order, which includes Parliament, its 
laws and any ancillary rules that affect trial outcomes but do not originate from within 
the courts. 
49 French suggests, similarly, that the importance of US Supreme Court decisions 
imbues them with a transcendental quality: “The oracular pronouncements of the 
Supreme Court authorise enormous changes in American life, and large segments of 
the population are informed about, and pay attention to, what the Justices decide.” 
French (n 7) 709. 
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of a causal process.” The other “is backward-looking and explanatory: that 
of showing which earlier conditions best account for some later event or 
state of affairs.”50 The legal judgment contains both of these elements: it 
looks to the facts of the case to establish a chain of precedent and it 
compares these facts to historical examples which serve both an 
explanatory and a guiding role: cases with similar factual circumstances 
can be matched together to help judges apply the most relevant rules. As 
discussed earlier, there is no doubt that the process of legal reasoning is the 
process of Bergsonian analysis, which yields relative knowledge.  
 The written word is the law’s agent. It forms a part of the law’s 
packaging,51 and carries legal principles from case to case. But language—
including legal language—changes over time. The word ‘awful’ once 
described something that inspires awe or wonder. The word ‘invaluable’ 
once meant ‘without value’. Similarly, legal terms have changed their 
meaning. One example is the term ‘non est factum’. In the case of Gallie v 
Lee, it was highlighted that the term was initially used in situations where 
“the person sought to be held liable did not in fact sign the document”. The 
term in 1970 referred to cases where the person signing a document 
believed that it “had one character or one effect whereas in fact its 
character or effect was quite different.”52 Changes in language reflect 
broader transformations in the cultural, political and legal landscape. 
 This is why the ‘ordinary and plain meaning rule’ has become an 
important interpretive maxim in the common law. And it led Lord Reid to 
conclude in Gallie that to adopt a new, modern reading of an old legal rule 
is unproblematic as long as this application is reasonable. But what is a 
‘plain meaning’? At a very minimum, it is a meaning that is contained 
within a temporal package: it is based on a generation’s cultural and 
linguistic norms. This slice in time, from which the ‘plain meaning’ of a 
law is drawn, does not transcend the particular temporal modality that has 
been adopted by the law. It exemplifies the hegemony of the temporal 
instant in the common law order, which confines events to limited and 
clearly defined temporal contexts. And it poses a new kind of justificatory 
problem for legal authority. For if we presume that to adopt a legal 
                                                
50 Antony Honoré, ‘Causation in the Law’ Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(2010), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-law/>. 
51 I borrow this expression from Julius Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of 
Common Law Growth (Butterworths 1985) 52, from which I also derive the source 
material for this section. 
52 Saunders v Anglia Building Society [1970] UKHL 5. 
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precedent is to apply an existing rule to a new set of facts—the key element 
of this process being the factual comparison of the contemporary dispute to 
existing precedent—then surely the rule must be applied according to its 
original meaning. The interpretive rule has been explained as a way for 
judges to avoid the danger of overriding parliamentary intention (a statute, 
we will remember, is binding on all courts); if a rule is read literally rather 
than interpreted according to the abstract standard of ‘original intention’, a 
judge cannot be accused of trying to create new law. But if the meaning of 
certain words used in statute or precedent has changed, the literal rule 
becomes self-defeating: it results in the creation of new law.  
 Case law has recognised that the literal rule poses a particular danger 
for common law judges. For “if the precise words [of a statute] are clear 
and unambiguous, in our judgment we are bound to construe them in their 
ordinary sense, even though it does lead, in our view of the case, to an 
absurdity or manifest injustice.”53 For a long time, the underlying principle 
was that courts have nothing to do with Parliamentary decision-making; 
any decision by Parliament, whether absurd or not, will be binding on the 
courts.54 
 This has been resolved with the development of two further rules: the 
golden rule and the mischief rule. The golden rule allows judges to stray 
from the literal meaning of statute where adherence to it would lead to 
“manifest absurdity”55 to an extent that makes the effect of the statute 
different from the intentions of legislators. The mischief rule looks to a 
problem (mischief) that Parliament was seeking to resolve, asks whether it 
could have been a mistake that Parliament had not resolved it, and 
considers what additional words could be inserted into the statute to 
remedy the discrepancy.56  
 We can see that the justification for the particular interpretive 
maxims serves to circumscribe the role of the judge while reducing the 
scope for legislative arbitrariness. In a different sense, it strengthens a 
nation’s political stability of which a functional and independent judiciary 
is a hallmark. The role of the judiciary serves as a balance and check on the 
powers of the legislature and executive. Its authority comes partly from the 
precision of this duty. Any breach of this remit would push judges into the 
role of legislators or executors, so limits on the powers of judges serve to 
                                                
53Abley v Dale (1851) 20 LJ 233.(Jervis CJ) 
54 R v Judge of the City of London Court [1892] 1 QB 273. 
55 Becke v Smith (1836) 2 M&W 195. 
56 See Lord Diplock in Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] AC 74. 
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enhance their independence. This impartiality, combined with the ability to 
safeguard against Parliamentary error, invites trust and confidence.    
 Another element of legal authority comes from the law’s structural 
coherence, which is set up as an antithesis to arbitrariness. Here the playing 
field is more contentious. We find ourselves at an impasse between the 
structure of the precedent, which operates in a temporally linear and 
hierarchical manner, creating rules of potentially indefinite validity, and the 
standards of statutory interpretation, which are more attuned to present 
social convention. Each element is contained in a temporal parcel, but the 
two often don’t exist in the same space; the sixteenth century precedent 
exists in the particular legal standards of its time, and the modern 
application of this precedent takes place within an entirely different socio-
cultural and legal package. The act of applying precedent, then, may 
involve creating a temporal discontinuity where one may not have existed. 
It is a kind of selective blending of temporal packages to reach a desired 
outcome.  
 At the core of this problem is the need to reconcile a stable, and 
therefore static and impartial legal structure with the transient and dynamic 
demands of particular cases. This gap finds a corollary in Husserl and 
Bergson, who outline the divide between the idealised world of symbols 
and real-world experience. On one hand, the world is “a rational systematic 
unity – this is thought to be a matter of apodictic insight – in which each 
and every singular detail must be rationally determined. Its systematic 
form… is purely mathematical.”57 On the other hand, Husserl contrasts this 
push towards the rationalisation of nature with the prescientific life-world, 
where:  
“All knowledge of laws could be knowledge only of predictions, 
grasped as lawful, about occurrences of actual or possible 
experiential phenomena, predictions which are indicated when 
experience is broadened through observations and experiments 
penetrating systematically into unknown horizons, and which are 
verified in the manner of inductions.”58 
Here, Husserl writes, we find no traces of mathematical time. That is, the 
prescientific lived world is one that lacks the tools for the precise 
measurement and compartmentalisation of time and events. This has 
important bearings for the law. The common law system derives its 
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Phenomenology (Northwestern University Press 1970) 65. 
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authority from pre-existing rules that are arranged within a particular 
temporal narrative. Common law judges are faced with a particular 
challenge: the reconciliation of old rules, kept valid through perpetuity, the 
changing norms of society and the cyclical demands of politics. The 
implication of a ‘non-scientific’ legal regime would be arbitrariness: the 
law would lack stable rules based on which consistent decisions can be 
reached in similar circumstances. In other words, the law’s role as a 
safeguard against arbitrariness would be compromised if its rules lacked 
the systematic structure of mathematical time.  
  But the basic structure of precedent lacks the temporal stability to 
fully support this paradigm of absolute non-arbitrariness. Legal decisions 
are not made when a change in the law becomes necessary, but when a 
particular dispute needs to be resolved. The occurrence of disputes, which 
serve as foundations for legal rules within the common law system, is 
entirely random. And so the creation of law becomes ad hoc; if no disputes 
arose for a century, the common law would remain static. This leads me to 
one important conclusion. Legal time, when constituted as a mathematical 
ideal, shows us that the absolute elimination of arbitrariness is an ambition 
of the common law that is not practically attainable within the confines of 
the system of precedent. The authority and bindingness of precedent 
elevates that moment in legal time to a transcendental status: this precedent 
is the source of truth for cases with similar factual backgrounds. The 
precedent’s randomness seems to be at odds with its significance. 
 But there is a stronger conclusion to be reached here, namely that the 
common law has developed an awareness of its structural limitations or, 
perhaps, its own type of intuition. In one way, the act of considering old 
rules in the light of new circumstances does not undo the law’s fixation 
with the instant. Ontologically, we cannot discuss context without recourse 
to mathematical time. Context is a temporal container. It is shorthand for 
events and trends that occupy a defined space in time. But an 
understanding of the importance of context says something about the way 
judges view precedent: as a static conduit for rules whose meaning is 
wholly dependent on a fluctuation in the lived world. That is to say: they 
are aware of the tension between the instant in time, or the unit of legal 
decision-making, and the lived world from which the instant is both 
inseparable and conceptually distant. In light of this self-awareness, the 
process of legal interpretation becomes a safeguard against the dogma of 
the instant, a mechanism developed by the judges to undo the law’s 
paradox. The institutions of the legal system become a counterpoint to the 
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transcendence of the legal judgment. Intuition and analysis are brought into 
closer harmony. 
 
F. CONCLUSION 
I feel it is necessary to preface this conclusion with a clarification. I have 
deliberately focused on the system of precedent in isolation of the other 
elements that constitute the common law regime. We have seen that the 
common law court forms part of a larger political machine that is carefully 
calibrated to deliver justice and promote stability. But taken on its own, the 
common law judge has immense authority to create law and, more 
crucially, to apply precedent. This system is an intrinsic part of the 
common law judiciary, but it is also unique to it. The judiciary’s 
independence from the vicissitudes of the political process – which is 
reflected in the timelessness of its decisions – serves to justify its authority. 
Understanding this particular source of authority matters.  
 The common law system has adopted two temporal ‘tools’ – the 
instant in time and perpetuity – as emblems of its stability and 
timelessness. The common law judge says: if there is a case whose factual 
circumstances correspond to the present dispute, the rules adopted in that 
previous case will apply. Thus, the precedent serves as a guiding force in 
the resolution of contemporary disputes. This happens regardless of the 
temporal context that the previous case was decided in, invariably giving 
rise to a dialectic between the old and the new.  But this temporal structure 
comes at a cost. In each trial, there is an interplay of a number of elements: 
past example, flowing through time as an indefinitely binding precedent, 
and the contemporary circumstances and predominant cultural norms that 
define the context of the case. The tension here is between structural 
stability, rooted in an idealised standpoint of the binary outcome of 
disputes occurring at a time, and the arbitrary temporality of the lived 
world, on which the development of the common law is dependent.  
 If the common law shares the structure of the literary narrative, it 
appears to lack its coherence. The chapters of the common law don’t occur 
in consistent intervals: they progress whenever disputes of sufficient 
importance arise, and progress to a court with the authority to define and 
redefine the governing rules. In other words: they lack the consistency and 
deliberateness of the narrative, but share its past-to-present form. More 
than that, the system of precedent is eternal. Unlike the literary narrative, it 
has no ending, and its conclusions are always subject to revision. The 
common law precedent is a product of that transcendental ideal that is 
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separated from human intuition. A precedent exists as a dormant source of 
legal truth that is awoken by disputes with similar facts. When a dispute 
occurs and reaches a sufficiently advanced level in the court hierarchy, the 
common law judge is given the power to draw a slice in time and declare: 
this is the law and it will be binding forever. The parasites of the narrative 
and of the transcendental imagination are very alive in the system of 
precedent. They create the risk that, in Bergsonian terms, the analytical 
process will precede intuition, creating fictions. 
 Judges play an important role in the democratic state. The particular 
temporal standpoint inherent in their decision-making process serves as an 
emblem of judicial stability; that is, it reflects a timelessness and 
procedural rigour that stands in contrast with the volatility and immediacy 
of the political system. On a systematic level, this stability is expressed as a 
narrative: disputes occur one after another and form a coherent and 
authoritative whole. But this formulation reflects a highly idealised 
conception of temporality, one that relies on the regular and orderly 
occurrence of relevant disputes. In the lived world, disputes occur much 
more randomly. This has direct implications for the internal structure of the 
common law. At the case level, judges may be bound by any number of 
factors, including precedent, statute and the contemporary facts of the 
dispute. The irregularity of past example means that, in some 
circumstances, judges will lack sufficiently contemporary legal tools to 
apply to a given case, but will nonetheless be bound by past decisions. 
There are ways to resolve these issues: Parliament can legislate to resolve a 
mischief in the law, and the Supreme Court can overrule a previous 
decision. But the discrepancy between ideal and reality is firmly embedded 
in the system of precedent. Judicial authority relies on a structural integrity 
that the lived world cannot deliver. To that extent, the common law judge’s 
claims to authority can only be measured in relation to the unattainable 
ideals of modular time. 
 In some cases, Parliament has stepped in when common law rules 
ceased to be relevant or coherent, but were of significant public interest. 
Today, advances in technology and the bureaucratic systems of the state 
have significantly increased the pace of the legislative process. A greater 
amount of legislation will serve to limit the ability of judges to invoke 
precedent, and might bring the common law system closer to the civil law.   
But putting aside the question of legislation, we can ask a more important 
question: what mechanisms has the law developed to mitigate these 
structural limitations? We have seen that the various interpretive maxims 
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available to the common law judge allow him to impart, at his discretion, 
greater context into the facts of a particular dispute. While this does not 
undo the law’s fixation with mathematical time, it gives ontological 
definition to the common law as a whole: it is not a legal system or a 
language, but a legal entity with its own intuition, conscious of its 
conceptual shortcomings and ingenious in developing safeguards against 
arbitrariness. And here is where I would begin my search for the common 
law’s authority. Not in structural soundness, but in sentience—in the 
common law’s ability to respond dynamically to its own paradoxes and, to 
an extent, undo them.  
  
